Germany before the national election
Denk ich an Deutschland in der Nacht,
Dann bin ich um den Schlaf gebracht,
Ich kann nicht mehr die Augen schließen,
Und meine heißen Tränen fließen.
Heinrich Heine, Nachtgedanken
Tomorrow the Germans elect a new federal parliament, more than 6 months earlier than originally scheduled. Given recent developments in Trumpland (Trump winning the election with the help of Musk, Trump turning on Ukraine and buying, seemingly, into Putin’s disinformation campaign, Trump turning on Europeans, Musk’s attempts to mess with European elections, etc.), this is unfortunate timing. Alas it is what it is. If you are being given lemons, it is best to try to turn them into lemonade.
The polls in Germany have been stable for weeks, notwithstanding the events of the last 3–4 months and not withstanding a flurry of debates in various configurations (a duel between Scholz and Merz, a foursome involving the leaders of the four largest parties/chancellor candidates: Scholz, Merz, Habeck, Weidel, and various other constellations.) The conservatives [= Union] and their chancellor candidate, Merz, are likely to earn about 30 percent of the votes, Labor and Greens (the two remaining parties of the current government) 15% and 13% respectively, the anti-immigration AfD (= Alternative for Germany) about 20%, and the three minor parties (the Lindner party aka FDP, the Wagenknecht party aka BSW, and The Left [= Die Linke]) 4%, 4%, and 7% respectively. If indeed Lindner party and Wagenknecht party do not make the 5% hurdle, then the normalized share of relevant votes will be correspondingly higher for those parties that make it. This will not make easier, unfortunately, the formation of a stable and effective coalition.
The comparative surge of Die Linke (from about 4% just a couple of weeks ago to now 7%) and the drifting down of the Wagenknecht party into predicted electoral insignificance (from about 7% in late 2024 to 4% now) have been the only truly remarkable poll changes over the weeks since Scholz announced the elections.
The elections, as you might recall, were triggered in early November 2024 by Lindner — a diva of the very special kind — when he goaded the chancellor, Scholz, to fire him as finance minister on 7 November 2024. Lindner goading Scholz to fire him was regarded by many as a move to curry favors with folks not happy with the German federal government, in a bid to save his party but mostly his own political ass. Subsequent revelations of the strategic nature of Lindner’s machinations added to his, and his party’s, poor showing in the polls. Remarkably, while two of Lindner’s party colleagues resigned from their cabinet posts, a third, Volker Wissing, decided to stay on as transport minister and to resign from his party. Clearly that did not help Lindner’s, and his party’s, poll numbers.
Can the polls be trusted? They have not moved around much ever since the Red[Social Democrats aka Labor]-Yellow[Free Democrats]-Green[Greens] “traffic light coalition” collapsed, so it is unlikely that the predicted vote shares will be far off. I would not be surprised if the AfD, in light of recent attacks in Munich, Aschaffenburg, Magdeburg , and in Berlin just yesterday will do somewhat better than predicted (closer to 25% than 20% I fear), notwithstanding Merz’s attempts to attract potential AfD voters through an anti-immigration focussed campaign. I would also not be surprised if both Labor and Greens will add a percentage point or two to their share of the votes. (Unfortunately, Scholz did not read the signs of the times and handed the baton to Pistorius, his —outspoken and competent — defense minister and Germany’s most popular politician; that could have been a game changer.) But the changes sketched out above will not make a difference in terms of the coalition options that will exist after the elections given that none of the parties is on record as not, under any circumstance, forming a coalition with the AfD which remains too toxic in its worldview for many Germans on grounds other than its anti-immigration politics. Sorry, Alice, but putting a lipstick on a pig does not do the trick you like it to do.
Two coalition options seem available. Both these options involve the conservatives. First, and most likely, Merz as chancellor leading a coalition of Union and Labor (with Scholz most likely retiring for good from politics and Pistorius taking on the role as leader of the Social Democrats, and possibly as minister for defense, or some other hi-visibility ministry). Second, but in my view unlikely, Merz as chancellor leading a coalition of Union and Greens (with both Habeck and Baerboeck staying on in their roles as minister for the economy and foreign minister, respectively).
Both options are not exciting — Merz in particular is an uninspiring and opportunistic politician — but they are what they are. Given the developments in Trumpland, or, say, Hungary, that’s not the worst of all worlds.
Whoever is in charge will have to deal with these three big issues:
- Cleaning up what is widely regarded a less than successful immigration policy over the last decade. Thanks, Angie. Nice idea but extra-ordinarily poor execution. Addressing the immigration issue is a must in light of the AfD’s continued success in state elections and, most likely, this federal election. It is also a must in terms of asserting the hard-won rights in particular of women in Germany. That said, it is important to remember that almost 30 percent of the German population now has an immigration background and that Germany, without its immigrants after WW 2, would be a geriatric society of the highest order.
- Increasing financial support for Ukraine. This is a must in light of Trump’s attempts to shift the burden of support to the Europeans, and it is not an outlandish demand. This is also a must in order to signal clearly to Putin and his thugs that territorial aggression of any kind is unacceptable. So far German politicians of all stripes (except AfD and Wagenknecht) have not been shy to comment on Vance’s and Trump’s litany of lies and misrepresentations.
- Addressing the structural problems that Germany’s economy (and infrastructure) faces. It was these problems that Lindner tried to score political points with. With Lindner gone, these problems will not go away and serious discussions will have to be had about the right way forward to balance efficiency and equity. Conceptually, the traffic light coalition was Germany’s best bet to advance these discussions and I regret it was brought down as the result of one person’s ego and his political miscalculation. Or so it looks for now.
The saving grace: While there is considerable disagreement about how to address the structural problems that Germany’s economy faces (and in this context how to best guarantee a stable energy supply), there is considerable agreement about the other two pressing policy issues (immigration and support for Ukraine) and I do not see this agreement to be severely tested by any of the coalitions that seems possible at this point. Good that.
When the current government coalition collapsed, German president, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, a Social Democrat, called for common sense to prevail: “This is no time for tactics and squabbling, but for reason and responsibility.” It was read by many (including myself) as a thinly veiled barb against Lindner who finished off a coalition that was not perfect for sure but managed immigration respectably, stood firmly in support of Ukraine and against Putin’s aggression, and managed to ween Germany off Russian energy supplies within a couple of years, with far-reaching consequences for the future and undesirable but unavoidable effects on prices within Germany for the time being. A principled stand is not something you take at no cost. And this coalition performed well under very difficult circumstances indeed.
Any Merz-led coalition will have relatively big shoes to fill. I am not optimistic it can but would be happy to be proven false.
